This case considered whether volunteer Coastguard Rescue Officers (CROs) should be treated as workers within the meaning of s230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 when they carry out certain activities where they were entitled to remuneration.
Background
Groom (“G”) was a volunteer CRO with the Maritime and Coastguard Agency from 1985 to 2020. Although CROs were described as volunteers and told they did not have an employment contract, the role functioned in the following way:
- They were expected to maintain a reasonable level of attendance at incidents.
- There was a formal code of conduct they had to follow.
- They could claim payment for many activities, including call‑outs and training.
- When they claimed payment, they received payslips and a yearly P60, just like employees.
After G was dismissed for disciplinary reasons, he brought an employment tribunal claim. One part of his claim depended on him establishing ‘worker’ status within the meaning of s230(3)(b) of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
At a preliminary hearing, the tribunal decided that G was not a ‘worker’ because there was no contract between him and the MCA in relation to the individual activities he carried out. G appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
What the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) decided
The EAT overturned the original decision. It held:
- The contractual documents governing the role clearly allowed CROs to be paid for many activities.
- It did not matter that some volunteers chose not to claim payment.
- A contract was formed each time the CRO attended an activity for which payment could be claimed.
- That contract involved the CRO providing services in return for pay — a classic “work for wages” arrangement.
The EAT therefore ruled that G was a worker on every occasion he attended a paid activity. The MCA subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal.
What the Court of Appeal Decided
The Court of Appeal agreed with the EAT and dismissed the MCA’s appeal. It held:
1. CROs are workers when they attend paid activities
Whenever a CRO responded to a call-out or attended another activity that entitled them to payment, they were doing so as a worker.
2. A contract existed during each paid activity
Even though CROs were free to choose whether to attend an activity, once they did attend, they had to follow reasonable instructions and they became entitled to claim payment. This showed a clear intention to create a legal relationship for that period.
3. There was mutuality of obligation
The MCA argued that because CROs could choose when to volunteer, they couldn’t be workers.
The Court rejected this argument and held that:
- Mutual obligations only need to exist while the work is actually being done.
- True volunteers receive expenses only, but CROs could receive pay for their time — and the MCA described this pay as “compensation for disruption to personal life or employment”.
- Paying someone for their time is the essence of employment-type work.
Therefore, CROs were clearly workers during paid activities.
What This Means in Practical Terms
Although Coastguard Rescue Officers are labelled “volunteers”, the Court held that when they carry out activities for which they can claim payment and when they must follow the MCA’s rules and instructions during those activities, they meet the legal definition of a worker.
This gives them certain employment rights during those times — for example, the right to be accompanied at a disciplinary hearing, which was relevant to G’s case.
This decision is important for all charities who make payments to volunteers where they carry out certain activities. Whilst “workers” do not have the same range of employment protections as employees, they do have an entitlement to some protections, including be paid national minimum wage, have paid holidays under the Working Time Regulations and have whistleblowing and discrimination protections. We recommend that charities review the arrangements they have with volunteers to ensure that they are in compliance depending on their employment status.
